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Gendered Due Process of Juvenile Justice 
Annette R. Appell
*
 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JUVENILE LAW 
The United States was founded on (incomplete)
1
 democratic 
notions that adults have the ability and authority to determine the 
course of their lives, to define their own values, to choose their 
religions, their politicians, and to govern themselves. This attribution 
of power to adults—initially white men, later African-American 
men,
2
 and finally women
3—affords adults the right to create and 
follow their own values and belief systems, and to inculcate their 
children and wards in the parents’ fundamental beliefs regarding 
religion, morality, cultural practices, values, and language.
4
 This 
Essay illustrates how the United States Constitution has developed a 
gendered jurisprudence for children and families that affords children 
a higher level of due process in juvenile courts than is afforded to 
their parents. Specifically, parent respondents in juvenile child 
protection matters are disproportionately mothers, while children on 
the juvenile delinquency docket are disproportionately males. 
United States constitutional law constructs the family as a 
fundamental social and political unit that is both public and private, a 
 
 
*
 
 I want to thank Kathleen DuBois, an attorney who represents parents in child welfare 
and other matters in juvenile and family court in St. Louis County, and who has worked with 
me and our Washington University law and social work students on behalf of mothers, fathers 
and other kin in child welfare matters. Ms. DuBois and I spent many hours in courts, client 
meetings, and student meetings. I and my students learned a great deal from her. I am also 
thankful to the Law School’s support of my research. 
 1. By “incomplete” I refer to the institution of slavery as well as the disenfranchisement 
of women. 
 2. The Civil War Amendments brought legal freedom to slaves. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 4. E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925). These opinions defer to an adult guardian, parent, or teacher to provide 
education, protection, and nurture to children. 
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social and legal institution that serves a variety of political and social 
objectives for the nation, families, and children, such as caring for 
and supporting vulnerable subjects—primarily, but not exclusively, 
children.
5
 In addition, the family provides a service not just in 
managing the vulnerability of children, but also in creating and 
maintaining a robust democracy, which supports a variety of values, 
cultures, and beliefs. The family and childhood embody, facilitate, 
and protect important constitutional rights aimed at preserving 
individual liberties, such as values related to faith, morality, religion, 
language, and other cultural practices.
6
 Under this scheme, the 
Constitution protects these parental liberties until children 
emancipate and become independent under the law. Until 
emancipation, the law constructs children as incompetent, dependent, 
and lacking authority in their own lives;
7
 while most adults are 
presumptively competent by virtue of their age.
8
  
These fundamental liberties are bedrock for a democratic republic 
that promises individual freedom of conscience and depends on 
democratically elected leaders to govern. The private family creates 
and maintains both diverse norms and values, and serves to rein in 
government and protect individual liberties that are important in a 
nation founded on freedom of thought and republican democracy.
9
 
Over time, the Supreme Court has carved out and shaped American 
constitutional liberties and enhanced them through the Civil War 
Amendments that ended legal slavery and enhanced individual 
freedoms against state power and abuse via the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These amendments abolished 
legal slavery;
10
 required due process when citizens are faced with 
deprivations of life, liberty, or property;
11
 the right (of men) to vote 
 
 5. See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (describing the privacy of the 
family and the right of parents to rear their children in the parents’ private norms and values). 
 6. Id.  
 7. The mature minor doctrine affords children more freedom regarding their bodies and 
health as they age. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
 8. Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 
HOUS. L. REV. 703, 706 (2009) [hereinafter Appell I]. 
 9. Id. at 743. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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regardless of their prior status as slaves;
12
 and eventually the 
extension of the franchise to women.
13
  
As a result, the modern Constitution constructs adults as legal, 
moral, and autonomous agents able to govern themselves and the 
polity, in contrast to children who have few autonomy rights.
14
 As 
such, adults—parents, guardians, and teachers—are responsible for 
caring for and training the next generation to become democratic 
citizens who will carry on or create and propagate diverse norms and 
values in their wards, which help to carry on both their kin’s or their 
own norms. This system balances the needs of the state, even as it 
hands the government mantle to, while respecting the private norms 
and values that produce diversity in a liberal democracy. As a result, 
children serve important roles in producing democracy by absorbing 
and protecting the private values that our democracy places in 
families.  
Despite the important roles childhood performs in a liberal 
democracy, children are largely without legal and political authority 
regarding their families, their choices and the polity.
15
 Indeed, the law 
divests children of authority over their own lives until they are 
emancipated, generally at age eighteen. Until then, generally
16
 they 
have little legal agency and if they become involved in a legal matter 
they will likely be represented by guardian ad litem (GAL) or next 
friend rather than an attorney.
17
  
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of a citizen’s “race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
 14. Originally, these rights were reserved for White free men. Eventually the system of 
slavery was legally if not socially and economically, vanquished, via constitutional amendments 
to emancipate slaves (Thirteenth Amendment), to institute due process of the law (Fourteenth 
Amendment), to protect the rights of African Americans to vote (Fifteenth Amendment), and 
women to vote via the Nineteenth Amendment’s guarantee of women’s franchise in 1920). See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX. 
 15. This is down from twenty-one years old. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 16. See Appell I, supra note 8 (describing the mature minor doctrine). 
 17. Generally, the GAL represents the child’s “best interests.” See Annette Ruth Appell, 
Representing Children Representing What?: Critical Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 597 (Summer 2008) [hereinafter Appell II]. See collectively 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (identifying school and religion cases that developed 
the doctrines of parental rights).  
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The privileges and freedoms the Constitution affords parents (and 
guardians) to mold children in the parents’ and guardians’ images and 
values is foundational to adult civil rights and liberal democracy. In 
addition, adults serve to mitigate children’s vulnerability while also 
rearing them in the family’s culture and values. This private labor 
helps to maintain pluralism in the polity. While the Constitution 
enumerates a number of rights and freedoms, the Supreme Court has 
identified rights the Constitution does not directly articulate or name, 
but which are essential to preserve the freedom promised in the 
Constitution. For this purpose, the Supreme Court established a 
theory of substantive due process to carve out, identify and protect 
fundamental liberties that are not enumerated but which undergird the 
liberal democracy of the Constitution. These cases established that 
adults—usually parents or guardians—have the right (and duty) to 
rear children privately in families and according to the culture and 
values of the parents or parent-like guardians. These substantive due 
process rights not only serve the parents, but also the democratic 
state, which depends on citizens with independent thought and values 
who can check the hegemony of the state.  
Thus, children are both burden and bounty for adults: burden in 
that adults must mediate children’s vulnerability through care, 
protection, education, support, and training for liberal adulthood; and 
bounty because parents have freedom to inculcate the child with 
norms, values, customs, and identity—and through that inculcation to 
carry forward parents’ culture, values, rituals, and beliefs.18 This 
adult freedom to determine one’s own values, goals, beliefs, and 
governance has developed through Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
childhood provides. The category of childhood also delineates the 
adult (adulthood) as the opposite of child, in that the category of 
childhood renders adults as categorially free and autonomous in 
contrast to children, who are vulnerable and developmental. In this 
way, children and families serve as pipelines to and create and 
 
 18. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501 (1998–1999) (describing substantive due 
process). 
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maintain value pluralism.
19
 Thus, I rely largely on families to protect 
vulnerability and rear children in the family’s image and propagate 
liberal democracy through the bodies and minds of children raised 
within the culture, values, and norms of their families, faith, and 
culture. These practices, parents and guardians, private and 
idiosyncratic values, in theory, protect democracy because our 
children have been raised with diverse norms, such as religion, 
language, culture, and other plural values and identities. The 
constitutional freedoms of religion, conscience, speech, due process, 
and cultural practices inform and reinforce democracy and liberal 
freedoms that the state and democratic institutions depend on to 
foster democratic citizens. Over time, for these reasons the Supreme 
Court has privileged families in the constitutional order in what has 
become known as “substantive due process.”20 This doctrine is based 
on the notion that there are constitutional rights that are necessary to 
a democratic republic and the utility of the Constitution. 
B. JUVENILE COURT PROCESS: CHILD PROTECTION AND 
DELINQUENCY 
Illinois established the first Juvenile Court in 1899 to provide 
protection, shelter, and discipline of children who were neglected, 
orphaned, impoverished, or otherwise without effective parents or 
guardians.
21
 These courts are therapeutic in that the role of the court 
is not necessarily to punish, but to place the child into a safe setting 
and create the conditions for return of the child to the parents, or if 
not possible, placement of the child within another family. 
The post-Civil War liberties created the doctrine of substantive 
due process, which holds that certain liberties are so fundamental to 
the liberal democratic process that they deserve heightened 
protection.
22
 Through this vehicle, the Supreme Court identified 
protected liberties not constitutionally enumerated, but which the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. As Peggy Cooper Davis observed, “[t]he Constitution of the United States does not 
contain the word ‘family.’” PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FAMILY VALUES 5 (1997). 
 21. 23 REV. STAT. OF ILL. § 171 (1899).  
 22. Chemerinsky, supra note 18. 
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Supreme Court adjudicates as fundamental in a liberal democratic 
republic. These freedoms are substantive and procedural;
23
 and they 
are also gendered in that parental rights afford lower procedure for 
parents than they do for children in juvenile delinquency matters, 
even though children are always under the care of an adult.   
This anomaly in the hierarchy of constitutional liberty that affords 
higher protection for children’s freedom in the juvenile justice 
system than the freedoms parents receive in the child welfare system 
is anomalous because parental liberty interests in rearing their 
children are fundamental. In child protection matters the state has 
great powers to disrupt, remove, or terminate the parental relationship 
with children. Yet, in this context, the parents’ family liberty interests 
in the care and nurture of their child affords lower process and 
protection of their liberty to parent their children than children—
whose liberties are not coextensive with adults’ liberty—receive in 
the juvenile justice docket, which adjudicates and punishes children 
who commit what would be crimes if children were adults. Thus in 
juvenile court child protection matters,
24
 parents (disproportionately 
mothers as compared to fathers),
25
 receive less process for their 
family liberty, than children receive on the delinquency docket 
(which is disproportionately populated by boys)
26
 and provides 
heightened process for the juvenile respondents, including the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to take the child into 
state custody.
27
 The process the Constitution affords parents in 
juvenile court child protection cases, is lower than process children 
 
 23. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY 
VALUES (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 171 
(2003). 
 24. The child protection docket of the juvenile court addresses parental abuse and neglect 
of their children. 
 25. Nationally, women were perpetrators more often than men, with 283,027 women 
maltreating children as compared to 234,098 men maltreating children. CHILDREN’S BUREAU 
OF THE U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 71 (2014), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2014.pdf. 
 26. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE COURT, 2013 
(2015), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248899.pdf (reporting juvenile court delinquency dockets 
heard 293,700 involving females and 764,800 involving males). 
 27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for 
juvenile adjudication). 
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on the juvenile justice docket, which is quasi criminal, but still 
technically civil. The state must prove the parent is unfit by clear and 
convincing evidence.
28
 With the exception of termination of parental 
rights proceedings, which afford a heightened process for the parents 
whose parental rights are at stake, the Constitution permits removal 
of abused and neglected children from their families based merely on 
preponderance of the evidence.
29
 Thus the protection of a parent’s 
parental rights is lower than the process due children in the juvenile 
justice docket.  
In other words, the process that is due parents in child protection 
matters in juvenile court is lower than the process afforded children 
in delinquency dockets (preponderance of the evidence) compared to 
the process afforded children in juvenile delinquency matters in 
juvenile court (beyond a reasonable doubt). This anomaly places the 
delinquent child’s procedural rights higher than the procedural rights 
of parents in child protection docket. 
Moreover, even though children are legally disabled and without 
autonomy until they reach adulthood, the rights and process afforded 
parent respondents
30
 (mostly mothers) in child protection matters are 
lower than the rights and process afforded children (mostly boys) 
who are respondents in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
31
 In other 
words, parents receive less process when their constitutional 
relationship to their children is at risk, than children receive on the 
juvenile justice docket. Thus, the juvenile delinquency docket affords 
more process to children who have committed what would be crimes 
if the children were adults than does the child protection docket 
protect the parents’ constitutional liberties in the child protection 
 
 28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (holding that “[b]efore a State may 
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process 
requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence”). 
 29. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 
18 (1981). 
 30. See Annette Appell, The Child Question, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1137, 1178. 
[hereinafter Appell III]. 
 31. E.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (addressing the right to due process with 
regard to pre-adjudication detention); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (addressing the right to 
counsel). 
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docket, despite the fundamental freedom the Constitution bestows on 
the status of parenthood.
32
  
The child protection docket utilizes civil process and addresses 
abuse, neglect and dependency of children whose parents or 
guardians are failing to provide adequate care and protection to their 
children or who abuse their children. These cases involving parents 
(or other custodians or guardians) of abused, neglected and dependent 
children afford the parents lower legal process than children receive 
in the delinquency dockets.
33
 Parents (usually adults) in child 
protection cases have lower legal protection and less process than the 
children in juvenile justice dockets.
34
 This treatment suggests that the 
juvenile justice
35
 dockets are gendered in this specific way: parents in 
the child protection docket are predominately mothers,
36
 while 
children in the delinquency docket, who are predominately boys,
37
 
receive higher process than autonomous adults who are parent 
respondents.  
The juvenile delinquency docket, which addresses offenses that 
would be crimes if the children were adults, affords children more 
procedural protections than parents receive in the child protection 
docket.
38
 The constitutional rights for children involved in the two 
arms of the juvenile court—the juvenile delinquency docket and the 
child protection docket—provides protections for children (against 
their parents) and the delinquency docket disciplines and punishes the 
children who commit what would be crimes if they were adults. This 
docket is a quasi-criminal justice system that provides a lighter touch 
on juveniles than the adult judicial system metes out on adults who 
commit crimes. This docket also, while disciplining children, 
disproportionally targets boys as compared to girls. The juvenile 
delinquency docket provides higher protection for children than the 
 
 32. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Appell I, supra note 8.  
 35. I use the term “juvenile justice” for proceedings in Juvenile Courts. 
 36. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV.’S, ADMIN., supra note 25. 
 37. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 26. 
 38. The juvenile court is a therapeutic court which is in theory designed to protect 
children and seek to reform, rather than punish children. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE IN THE MAKING xiii 23–24 (2004).  
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child protection docket, which affords lower process to parents than 
children in the JJ docket.  
This structure is an anomaly because children in the JJ docket, 
who do not have the same freedoms as adults, receive higher process 
in the juvenile court than do parents in that same court’s child 
protection docket. This process presents an anomaly in that the 
heightened protection for juveniles in the JJ docket for children is 
higher than parents (mainly mothers) receive in the CP docket. Thus, 
children on the JJ docket receive higher process in Juvenile Court 
than do the parents in the CP docket, despite the foundational 
liberties of parental rights. This hierarchy of liberty is anomalous in 
light of the position of parental liberty in our constitutional system. In 
the juvenile court, parents have less liberty than children who commit 
what would be crimes if they were adults.
39
 
C. JUVENILE COURT: PROTECTING AND PUNISHING CHILDREN 
OUTSIDE THE FAMILY 
As noted above,
40
 the United States, a liberal democracy, prizes 
adult freedom and the rights of parents, teachers, and guardians to 
rear children in the values of these adults. This structural 
privatization of children (and of vulnerability more broadly) provides 
for a rich, vibrant and diverse nation, but the privatization of care and 
protection is centered in families. While this private caregiving serves 
political freedom, it can fail some children. For this reason, in 1899 
Cook County, Illinois established the first Juvenile Court in the 
nation on the west side of Chicago. This court’s purpose was to 
protect and govern children who did not have adults to care for 
them.
41
 These were children whose parents or caregivers could not or 
would not care for them or abandoned, abused, neglected or 
otherwise left them without support or the care of adults. These 
children worked, begged, stole or were otherwise unable or unwilling 
to be cared for by their families.
42
 At the time, the administrative 
 
 39. See generally Appell III, supra note 30 (addressing the justification for limiting 
children’s rights as compared to adult rights). 
 40. See supra, note 15 and accompanying text. 
 41. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, ILL Laws 131 (1899). 
 42. See supra Part A. of this this Essay. 
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state was nascent at best
43
 and the court system served as protector, 
parent, and disciplinarian for these children who do not have homes 
or support. Missouri established its juvenile court system in 1903.
44
  
The juvenile courts created and continue to utilize a model of 
“therapeutic justice” that Illinois developed to manage, protect, and 
regulate children who were without parents or guardians; who were 
orphaned, abandoned, abused or neglected; and who were, by virtue 
of their circumstances, on the streets, stealing, fighting, trespassing, 
and loitering because they had no homes or no parents or guardians to 
care for them. The juvenile court’s mission was to protect and 
regulate children who were without parental figures or whose parents 
or guardians were not willing or able to care for or control their 
minor wards. The innovation of this court was, in theory, not to 
punish or fine the children or their parents, but to protect them and to 
put them on the right track toward placement back home, in another 
home, or prepared for independence. The juvenile court movement 
spread through the nation. Over the years these problem-solving 
courts grew and spread through the country to provide adjudication 
and oversight for children and parents who needed assistance.  
The two main branches of juvenile justice are child protection 
(CP), which concerns itself with parental abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, and other inability of children to receive care; and 
juvenile justice (JJ) system which addresses juvenile offenses that 
would be crimes if the child were an adult. The JJ system is a mix of 
quasi-criminal and quasi-civil systems. In JJ, the children are the 
respondents while the in the CP system the parents are the 
respondents. 
The child abuse and neglect (CAN) system includes child abuse, 
neglect and dependency, the Child Abuse Hotline, and state 
children’s agencies. The juvenile justice docket is a semi-parallel 
system for the juvenile justice/delinquency (JJ) docket, which seeks 
 
 43. The first national administrative office was the Children’s Bureau, which concerned 
itself with child welfare. The Bureau sought to identify and certify each child for the dual 
purposes of counting and cataloging people and most importantly to give them an identity to 
afford a way of tracking the person and to provide rights and protections for them. Annette R. 
Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 373 (2014) [hereinafter Appell IV]. 
 44. MISSOURI JUV. JUST. ASS’N, CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN 
MISSOURI 1903–2003 (2003), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/100years.pdf. 
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to reform children who commit what would be crimes if they were 
adults. These two dockets also established divergent treatment for the 
parents in the CP system and the children in the JJ system. The 
Supreme Court has created procedural protections for juvenile 
respondents, who are disproportionately male.
45
 These protections 
include a variety of quasi-criminal rights in JJ dockets for the 
juvenile respondents.  
Over the years, the Supreme Court has carved out rights for JJ 
respondents that are based on the Constitution’s protections for adults 
in the criminal system. These protections include the right of the 
juvenile to and the standard of proof the same as an adult, “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” the same as adults receive.46 In contrast, the 
parent-respondents in CP cases, disproportionally mothers, receive a 
less robust set of protections, in part because the CP hearings are 
solely civil matters in nature, unlike the quasi-criminal JJ docket. The 
Supreme Court has developed a series of due process protections for 
the children on the JJ docket, but fewer for the CP docket, where the 
wrong-doers are the parents and the children are without legal 
agency.
47
  
The protections for parents
48
 include basic procedural and 
substantive due process rights, including heightened burdens of proof 
for state termination of parental rights.
49
 These rights and protections 
 
 45. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 132 (2012); J.D.B v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 
(2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 
(1966) (encompassing thirteen juvenile justice cases in juvenile court versus five child welfare 
cases in juvenile courts). 
 46. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). 
 47. For example, children in the child welfare docket are represented by guardians ad 
litem, who protect the child’s best interests rather than the child’s wishes. See Appell II, supra 
note 17.  
 48. Or parent-like individuals, such as teachers, guardians, or aunts. E.g., Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
 49. There are statutory and case law protections in place to shield Indian children and 
their parents from the hegemony of the state in adjudicating child abuse and neglect. See The 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
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are foundational to the United States’ political and constitutional 
system, a system that depends on a democratic populous with plural 
norms and values passed down through families to maintain a vibrant 
and diverse populous who can freely govern under democratic rule 
based on individual and family norms and beliefs. Indeed, the 
Constitution, with its checks and balances among government 
branches and the Bill of Rights, works to protect individual, family, 
cultural, and religious liberty. Substantive due process, which applies 
to the value of the familial relationship, is both integral to adult 
freedom and the development of children in a liberal democracy. 
These well-known and longstanding freedoms apply not just to the 
nuclear or extended family, but to adults such as teachers, preachers, 
guardians,
 
and parents.
50
  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has a busy juvenile crime docket (as 
compared to the child protection docket).
51
 Juvenile crime dockets 
are where these rights and relationships become skewed. The children 
who commit what would be a crime if the child was an adult receive 
higher levels of due process than do the parents in the child 
protection system, despite the substantive liberties that are afforded to 
children’s caregivers (generally parents).52 Children who commit 
 
 50. Supra notes 44–45. 
 51. The Supreme Court has addressed the rights of juvenile justice respondents numerous 
times since deciding In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), while the Supreme Court has addressed 
parental rights in just four cases coming from the juvenile court’s child protection docket. See 
Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010) (declining to hear the state's appeal); 
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (holding that the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980, 42 USC 1983, did not create a right to sue based on for purposes of 
federal child welfare law); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53–54 
(1989) (upholding application of the Indian Child Welfare Act for adoptions of Indian children 
and upholding Tribal court jurisdiction over state courts); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for 
Equality & Reform et al., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding parents have a liberty interest in their 
children that requires consideration of private interest affected by official action; risk of 
erroneous deprivation of interest through procedures used; and value of any additional 
safeguards).  
 52. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768–69 (1982) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the state apply the clear and convincing 
standard to terminate parental rights). Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter held that the 
parent has no clear right to an appointed attorney for a mother when the state seeks to terminate 
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juvenile offenses have a variety of constitutional protections 
regarding freedom including the right to counsel, and softer versions 
of the constitutional criminal provisions.  
Yet the due process rights for parents in the juvenile court’s CP 
docket are the same as the general civil law for torts and contracts: 
preponderance of the evidence. It is not until the state seeks to 
terminate parental rights permanently that a higher burden of proof 
applies and a parent has the right to counsel. In this context, the rights 
of children who break the law are more robust than are the rights of 
parents, who play such an important role in the constitutional lexicon. 
This anomaly suggests that the minimal freedom of children—who 
are always in the custody of adults—is actually more robust for 
children who break the law than is the process afforded parents’ 
liberty regarding their children. Finally, I am not advocating for 
lesser rights for children accused of what would be crimes if they 
were adults, but noting that juvenile justice is more robust for 
children who commit juvenile crimes than it is for mothers on the 
child protection docket.  
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